

Arms Export Control Act of weapons, equipment, and support for: seventy-two (72) F-15QA aircraft, one hundred forty-four (144) F-110-GE-129 aircraft engines, eighty (80) Advanced Display Core Processor II (ADCP II), eighty (80) Digital Electronic Warfare Suites (DEWS), eighty (80) M61A "Vulcan" gun systems, eighty (80) Link-16 systems, one hundred sixty (160) Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems (JHMCS), three hundred twelve (312) LAU-128 missile launchers, eighty (80) AN/APG-82(V)1 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars, one hundred sixty (160) Embedded OPS/Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) (EGI), eighty (80) AN/AAQ-13 LANTIRN navigation pods w/containers, eighty (80) AN/AAQ-33 SNIPER Advanced Targeting Pods w/containers, eighty (80) AN/AA-42 Infrared Search and Track Systems (IRST), two hundred (200) AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles, seventy (70) AIM-9X Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM), eighty (80) AIM-9X special training missiles, twenty (20) CATM AIM-9X missile guidance units, twenty (20) AIM-9X tactical guidance kits, two hundred fifty (250) AIM-120C7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM), five (5) AIM-120C7 spare guidance kits, one hundred (100) AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM), forty (40) AGM-88 HARM CATMs, two hundred (200) AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapons (JSOW), eighty (80) AGM-84L-1 Standoff Strike anti-ship missiles (Harpoon), ten (10) Harpoon exercise missiles, two hundred (200) AGM-6502 (Maverick) missiles, five hundred (500) GBU-38 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) guidance kits, five hundred (500) GBU-31 (V1) JDAM guidance kits, two hundred fifty (250) GBU-54 Laser JDAM guidance kits, two hundred fifty (250) GBU-56 Laser JDAM guidance kits, five hundred (500) BLU-117B bombs, five hundred (500) BLU-117B bombs, six (6) MK-82 Inert bombs, and one thousand (1,000) FMU-152 Joint programmable fuzes. Also included were ACMI (P5) Training Pods, Reece Pods (DB-110), Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs), Identification Friend/Foe (IFF) system, AN/AVS-9 Night Vision Goggles (NVG), ARC-210 UHF/UVF radios, LAU-118(v)1/A, LAU-117-AV2A, associated ground support, training materials, mission critical resources and maintenance support equipment, the procurement for various weapon support and test equipment spares, technical publications, personnel training, simulators, and other training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated total cost was \$21.1 billion. Major Defense Equipment (MDE) constituted \$11.5 billion of this total.

On January 5, 2018, Congress was notified by Congressional certification transmittal number 0C-17 for the replacement of the previously notified two hundred (200) AGM-65H/K (Maverick) missiles (MDE), with two hundred (200) AGM-65G (Maverick) missiles (MDE); the inclusion of eighty (80) AAR-57A Common Missile Warning Systems (MDE), which were included in the total value of the DEWS systems previously notified, but not enumerated as MDE in the original notification; the replacement of five hundred (500) BLU-111B bombs, five hundred (500) BLU-117B bombs, and six (6) MK-82 Inert bombs (all MDE), with five hundred (500) BLU-111B or MK-82 (500lbs) bombs, five hundred (500) BLU-117B or MK-84 (2,000 lbs) bombs, and six (6) MK-82 Inert bombs (all MDE); and the inclusion of the following sub-components of JDAM and Laser JDAM guidance kits. The MDE sub-components were included in the total value previously notified, but not enumerated in the original notification:

a. Two hundred fifty (250) GBU-38 JDAMs with KMU-572 Air Foil Groups (AFG) (MDE);

b. Two hundred fifty (250) GBU-31 JDAMs with KMU-557 AFG (MDE);

c. Two hundred fifty (250) GBU-54 Laser JDAMs with KMU-572 AFG (MDE) and DSU-38 Laser Seeker; and

d. Two hundred fifty (250) GBU-56 Laser JDAMs with KMU-557 AFG (MDE) and DSU-40 Laser Seeker.

The replacement or upgrading of the equipment to MDE did not result in a change to the estimated cost of MDE of \$11.5 billion. The total estimated case value remained \$21.1 billion.

On November 28, 2018, Congress was notified by Congressional certification transmittal number 0L-18 reported the inclusion of additional training assets as MDE to support the previously notified AGM-65 (Maverick) missiles: five (5) TGM-65 Maverick-Missile Aircrew Trainer; one (1) TGM-65 Maverick-Missile Load Trainer; and one (1) TGM-65 Maverick-Missile Maintenance Trainer. The estimated value of the additional MDE items was \$3.5 million but its addition did not result in a net increase in the MDE value notified. The total estimated case value remained \$21.1 billion.

This transmittal reports the inclusion of up to Five Hundred (500) GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs Increment I (SDB I) (MDE); One (1) GBU-39 A/B Focused Lethality Munition (FLM) Practice Bomb (MDE); One (1) GBU-39 B/B Laser SDB Practice Bomb (MDE); Four (4) MS-110 Reconnaissance Pod Retrofit Kits (non-MDE); Two (2) Transportable Ground Station Upgrades (non-MDE); One (1) Fixed Ground Station Upgrade (non-MDE); and associated spares; systems/material; support; and services. These additional MDE and non-MDE items are valued at \$35 million in MDE and \$220 million in non-MDE. However, the total estimated case value will remain \$21.1 billion.

(iv) Significance: This notification is being provided to report the inclusion of MDE that were not enumerated at the time of the original notification. Inclusion of these items of MDE/non-MDE results in an increase in capability over what was originally notified. This equipment will support the requested weapon system, support the capabilities of Qatar's F-15QA fleet, and contribute to interoperability with the United States.

(v) Justification: This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States. Qatar is an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Arabian Gulf region. The procurement of SDBs, MS-110 Retrofit Kits, and associated materiel/services will significantly improve Qatar's defense capabilities to meet current and future threats and deter regional aggression.

(vi) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb Increment I (SDB I) is a 250-pound weapon designed as a small, all weather, autonomous, conventional, air-to-ground, precision glide weapon able to strike fixed and stationary re-locatable targets from standoff range. The SDB I weapon system consists of the weapons, the BRU-61/A (4-place pneumatic carriage system), shipping and handling containers for a single weapon and the BRU-61/A either empty or loaded, and a weapon planning module. It has integrated diamond-back type wings that deploy after release, which increase the glide time and therefore maximum range. The SDB I Anti-Jam Global Positioning System aided Inertial Navigation System (AJGPS/INS) provides guidance to the coordinates of a stationary target. The payload/warhead is a very effective multipurpose penetrating and blast fragmentation warhead couples with a cockpit selectable electronic fuze. Its size and accuracy allow for an effective munition with less collateral damage. A proximity sensor provides height of burst capability.

2. An MS-110 Retrofit kit converts a DB-110 into an MS-110. The MS-110 is a NonProgram of Record tactical reconnaissance pod with long range, day/night, multispectral sensor technology. The multi-spectral sensor lets the end user see color and better distinguish subtle features that a DB-110's dual band imagery cannot. The pod can transmit imagery via a datalink to ground-stations for near-real time analysis and exploitation. The pod is designed for carriage on fighter jets. There are no advanced technologies in the system, subsystems, equipment or technical manuals that could be exploited by a technologically-advanced adversary.

The highest level of classification of defense articles, components, and services included in this potential sale is SECRET.

(vii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: December 8, 2021.

BUDGETARY REVISIONS

Mr. SANDERS. Mr. President, S. Con. Res. 14, the fiscal year 2022 congressional budget resolution, included a reserve fund in section 3003 to allow the chairman of the Senate Committee on the Budget to revise budget aggregates, committee allocations, and make adjustments to the pay-as-you-go ledger for legislation that would not increase the deficit over the period of fiscal years 2022 to 2031.

The Senate will soon consider S. 610, the Protecting Medicare and American Farmers from Sequential Cuts Act, as amended by the House, which meets the condition of being paid for and not increasing the deficit over the 10-year period. As such, I am filing a revision to the aggregates and committee allocations under the budget resolution, which were filed on September 23. Specifically, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that S. 610 will increase budget authority in 2022 by \$7.65 billion and outlays by \$7.144 billion. Over 5 years, budget authority and outlays will increase by \$7.079 billion, while there is no net increase to outlays over the 10-year period. I am increasing the aggregate amount of budget authority and outlays for 2022, as well as the allocation to the Committee on Finance and the Senate pay-as-you-go ledger, by those amounts.

I ask unanimous consent that the accompanying tables, which provide details about the adjustment, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REVISIONS TO BUDGET AGGREGATES—BUDGET AUTHORITY AND OUTLAYS	
(Pursuant to Section 3003 of S. Con. Res. 14, the Current Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2022)	
(\$ in billions)	
	2022
Current Spending Aggregates:	
Budget Authority	4,137.815
Outlays	4,497.102
Adjustment:	
Budget Authority	7.650
Outlays	7.144
Revised Aggregates:	
Budget Authority	4,145.465
Outlays	4,504.246

REVISIONS TO ALLOCATION TO SENATE COMMITTEES
(Pursuant to Section 3003 of S. Con. Res. 14, the Con-
current Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2022)
(\$ in billions)

	2022	2022–2026	2022–2031
Finance:			
Budget Authority	2,929.972	15,675.717	37,803.344
Outlays	3,025.410	15,761.012	37,875.037
Adjustments:			
Budget Authority	7.650	7.079	–2.380
Outlays	7.144	7.079	0.000
Revised Allocation:			
Budget Authority	2,937.622	15,682.796	37,800.964
Outlays	3,032.554	15,768.091	37,875.037

PAY-AS-YOU-GO SCORECARD FOR THE SENATE
(Revisions Pursuant to Section 3003 of S. Con. Res. 14,
the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal
Year 2022)
(\$ in billions)

	Balances
Current Balances:	
Fiscal Year 2022	0
Fiscal Years 2022–2026	0
Fiscal Years 2022–2031	0
Revisions:	
Fiscal Year 2022	7.144
Fiscal Years 2022–2026	7.079
Fiscal Years 2022–2031	0
Revised Balances:	
Fiscal Year 2022	7.144
Fiscal Years 2022–2026	7.079
Fiscal Years 2022–2031	0

CONFIRMATION OF C.B.
SULLENBERGER III

Mr. LEE. Mr. President, On December 2, 2021, the Senate confirmed C.B. Sullenberger III to be Representative of the United States to the International Civil Aviation Union—ICAO—with the rank of Ambassador. After receiving responses to a series of written questions to the nominee, I remain concerned about this nominee's approach to the Ambassador position.

In response to questions on balancing regulation with the need for an open environment for innovation, Mr. Sullenberger emphasized a position that favored more regulation at the expense of innovation, as well as deference to standards established internationally rather than those generated in the U.S. I do not disagree with the need for essential safety standards to protect the flying public; however, I believe Mr. Sullenberger's views cross a threshold in which the automatic preference for government regulation, particularly international government regulation, risks stunting the growth of aviation startups in emerging technology, entrench the largest players, and result in the exclusion of State and local jurisdictions from conversations in emerging areas of unmanned flight below the airspace of manned aviation.

Finally, based on Mr. Sullenberger's responses, I am not convinced that he would properly advocate that the United States lead at ICAO in setting standards that would swiftly bring civil supersonic air travel to fruition. For these reasons, I did not offer my consent to confirm Mr. Sullenberger unanimously and instead requested a voice vote.

DEMOCRACY SUMMIT

Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, I rise today—on International Anti-Corruption Day, as declared by the United Nations—to speak about the Democracy Summit that President Biden is convening today and tomorrow, to which government leaders from 110 countries have been invited. It will also include a range of leading civil society actors, business and labor leaders, civic educators and investigative journalists, philanthropists, and nonprofit leaders as speakers and participants.

Undeterred by the Coronavirus pandemic, the Biden administration has organized a global virtual gathering with participants tuning in from six continents. It is an ambitious, even audacious, undertaking.

And it comes at a critical time, as the world is now 15 years into a global democratic recession, according to the well-respected watchdog organization Freedom House. In its widely cited annual survey of freedom, it has reported that, in each of the past 15 years, more countries have seen their democracy scores decline than the number of countries whose scores have improved. And last year, during the height of the global pandemic, nearly 75 percent of the world's population lived in a country that saw its democracy score deteriorate last year.

For a President who has pledged to put democratic values at the heart of American foreign policy, it is fitting and proper that he should convene the democratic leaders of the world and other relevant parties to plan the revitalization of global democracy.

Of course, readers of the annual Freedom House assessment will know that there are not 110 well-functioning, effective democracies in the world and that way too many poorly performing nominal democracies have been invited to this gathering, thus diluting its character.

While some conspicuously back-sliding countries, like Hungary and Turkey, have not been invited, there are numerous back-sliding pseudo-democracies, including the current governments of the Philippines and Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia, Bolsonaro's Brazil among others, that unfortunately have been included.

Then there is India, which dropped from Free to Partly Free status in Freedom in the World 2021, which contributes significantly to the fact that 75 percent of the world's people last year resided in countries moving away from democracy. Yet the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, after its sustained crack down on critics during the past 2 years and the atrocious scapegoating of Muslims, who were disproportionately blamed for the spread of the virus and faced attacks by vigilante mobs, has been invited to the Democracy Summit.

Members of the Senate will also know that there has been precious little information sharing with this body

about the contours of the summit. There has been no discussion with us about the invitation list or the way forward from this week's summit, which I see as a missed opportunity for the Biden administration.

On the other hand, I was proud to be able to participate in a side event convened last Friday morning by the House Democracy Partnership for a discussion with legislators from other countries about the important role that parliaments can and do play in leading their governments to address the enduring and universal problem of corruption. I want to congratulate Representative DAVID PRICE of North Carolina for his leadership of that important initiative and for convening a productive international exchange of views last week in the run up to the President's gathering. One of the main take-aways from that webinar was that it is always incumbent on the legislatures of the world to press forward with laws that instruct and enable executive branch officials to elevate their work to combat corruption.

This is the main topic of my intervention today, to discuss one of the hopeful aspects of the President's Democracy Summit, which is the central role that the battle against corruption is playing in the proceedings and to underscore the leading role that we in the Congress must take to compel further action from our colleagues in the executive branch.

History tells us that they will likely not do so on their own. In fact, the history of anti-corruption laws in the United States is replete with fervent opposition from the executive branch, whether during Democratic administrations or Republican, to virtually every measure proposed in the Congress. This was true of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, which barred U.S. companies and their officials from paying bribes in foreign countries. The executive and the business community declared that this would end the ability of American corporations to do business around the world, which turned out not to be true, of course.

Indeed, it became in due course a foundational element in the United Nations Convention Against Corruption—UNCAC—and other elements of the international architecture of the battle against corruption.

Yet the executive has continued to oppose every measure introduced in Congress to address kleptocrats and human rights abusers, including the original Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 and its successor, the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act of 2016.

This is especially ironic because, since the enactment of the 2016 law, both Republican and Democratic administrations have been utilizing the law frequently and to good effect. Indeed, today, Secretary of State Tony Blinken announced that—on the occasion of International anti-Corruption